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Abstract: In view of the declining oil prices and production challenges, Nigeria 
economy which is highly dependent on oil revenue must enhance its taxation to ensure 
stable flow of revenue for financing development.  This study is a proposed model of 
small corporate taxpayers’ tax non-compliance behavior in Nigeria. This study reviews 
previous literature and developed its model based on deterrence and social exchange 
theories. This study extends the findings of previous studies by investigating the direct 
influence of the role of tax tribunal and the moderating and mediating effects of public 
governance quality and tax compliance costs respectively on non-compliance behavior 
of small corporate taxpayers in Nigeria. If the model is validated, this study would 
continue to collect data and analyze accordingly with the hope that the findings of the 
final study would help in formulating policy to curtailing tax non-compliance and hence 
increasing government revenue from taxation 
 
 




Stable flow of revenue is prerequisite for the 
operation and sustenance of every 
government.  Taxation stands to be one of the 
oldest and certain source of revenue to 
governments. Hence, taxation accounts for 
significant percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of many developed and 
developing countries. For instance, In the UK 
and Australia the average GDP to tax ratios 
are 23.06% and 20.83% respectively for the 
period of 2010 to 2012 (World Bank, 2015). 
On the other hand, in the developing 
countries of similar economic status to 
Nigeria, such as South Africa and Kenya, the 
average ratio for the same period reported 
by the same source are 26.07% and 19.6%. In 
the case of Nigeria, the ratio has been 
reported to be disappointing with an average 
of 1.90% for the period under consideration. 
The Nigerian GDP to tax revenue ratio is 
below  the recommended level of 15% for 
low-income countries like Nigeria (Cobham, 
2005). This ratio indicates the under 
performance of the tax revenue in Nigeria 
which call for serious investigation to bridge 
this gap. This situation is requiring more 
attention especially in this period of 
decreasing government revenue. Recently, 
the oil revenue has decreased by about 50% 
because of the recent fall in oil prices and 
decreased production due to the militant oil 
facility destruction in the Niger Delta. 
Therefore, reducing tax non-compliance 
among all classes of taxpayers (individual 
and corporate) can bridge the gap in the 
government revenue and provide a stable 
means of diversification for the government 
revenue sources. Hence the situation 
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requires comprehensive model to investigate 
the factors that explain the tax non-
compliance behavior of the taxpayers for 
better tax policy and increasing government 
revenue. The next section of the paper 
provides summary of related literature 
review to guide the development of the 
proposed model of the study. Section three 
discusses the development of the proposed 
mode which is based on the deterrence and 
social exchange theories. The section also 
discusses the contribution of the study to 
corporate tax non-compliance literature. The 
final section provides conclusion of the 
paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The literature of tax non-compliance has 
been bias to individual tax compliance 
behavior despite the huge revenue 
contribution of corporate taxpayers 
(Atanassov & Liu, 2014). Most of the studies 
concentrated on individual taxpayers 
(Alabede, Ariffin, & Idris, 2011b; Allingham & 
Sandmo, 1972; James Alm et al., 2012; James 
Alm, Bahl, & Murray, 1990; Fischer, Wartick, 
& Mark, 1992; Kirchler, 2007; Palil & 
Mustapha, 2011; Saad, 2009; Srinivasan, 
1973; Torgler, 2007). The classical studies 
explained tax non-compliance behavior 
based on deterrence measures (Allingham & 
Sandmo, 1972; Srinivasan, 1973). They 
emphasized that tax non-compliance decision 
is determine by the detection probability and 
the cost of penalty. The non-compliance 
behavior analysis of the classical studies is 
based on the economic theory of Becker 
(1968). However, this approach has been 
criticized of being limited and inconclusive 
because tax compliance is a complex 
phenomenon that can be explained by other 
factors from psychological and social angles  
(James Alm, 1999; Casey & Scholz, 1991; 
Jackson & Milliron, 1986). The preceding 
studies tried to bridge this gap by extending 
the tax non-compliance model to include the 
psychological and social determinants of tax 
non-compliance behavior (Weigel, Hessing, & 
Elffers, 1987). Hence, Jackson and Milliron 
(1986) identified 14 determinants of tax 
non-compliance behavior in their 
compressive review of the determinants of 
tax non-compliance behavior. Fischer et al. 
(1992) latter classified these 14 
determinants into four categories. (1) 
Demographic factors: age, gender and 
education. (2) Tax-system structure 
variables: tax rate, penalty, probability of 
detection and the complexity of tax system 
and tax authority contact. (3) Non-
compliance opportunity factors: income 
level, income sources and occupation. (4) 
Attitude and perception: fairness, ethics and 
peer influence. Several studies extended the 
Fischer’s model by incorporating more 
determinants of tax non-compliance 
behavior. For instance, Mustafa (1996) 
added  knowledge and understanding of tax. 
Chau and Leung (2009) suggested the 
influence of culture on tax compliance 
behavior. More recently, a Nigerian study 
investigated the direct influence of public 
governance quality, ethnic diversity and 
indirect effects of personal financial 
condition and risk preference (Alabede, 
Ariffin, & Idris, 2011a). Moreover, Alabede, 
Idris and Ariffin (2011) added the influence 
of perceived tax service quality. It has been 
acknowledged that most of these studies of 
tax compliance focused on individual tax 
non-compliance behavior and were 
conducted in the developed countries and 
other foreign countries (Atanassov & Liu, 
2014; Joulfaian, 2014). 
 
Focusing on corporate tax non-compliance 
behavior, the limited studies of corporate 
taxpayers identified several factors that 
influence corporate tax non-compliance 
behavior. Like the individual tax compliance 
studies, the early studies of corporate 
taxpayers focused on tax structure variables 
and were based on the Allingham and 
Sandmo model (AL model). Specifically, the 
studies have investigated the impact of tax 
rate, detection probability/audit, penalty 
and public disclosure profit performance 
(Joulfaian & Rider, 1998; Kamdar, 1997; 
Mills, 1996, 1998; Murray, 1993; Rice, 1992). 
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Later on, other studies conducted 
incorporated firm characteristics, social and 
institutional factors such as managers’ 
personal income tax compliance, national 
culture, trust, corruption, fairness of legal 
system, governance quality, enforcement 
technology, political incentives and cultural 
norms (Alon & Hageman, 2013; Hanlon, Mills 
& Slemrod, 2005; Joulfaian, 2009; 
Richardson, 2006, 2008; Slemrod, 2007; 
Tsakumis, Curatola & Porcano, 2007).  
 
Although several studies have investigated 
different factors that influence corporate tax 
non-compliance behavior, Alm (1999) and 
Jackson and Milliron (1986) had 
acknowledged that tax compliance behavior 
may be explained by other factors outside 
those in the basic model or that captured by 
the theory. They stressed that other variables 
may well be relevant in explaining this 
complex behavior. Similarly, Alms, Martinez-
Vazquez and Torgler (2010) showed that the 
relationship between tax non- compliance 
behavior and its determinants is complex and 
need alternative approaches for better 
understanding of the phenomenon. Hence, 
this study proposed the direct influence of 
the role of tax tribunal and the indirect 
effects of public governance quality and tax 
compliance costs to extend the literature of 
corporate tax non-compliance behavior. In 
addition, this study will be conducted in a 
developing country of Africa. Thus, this study 
answered the call of (Alon & Hageman, 2013; 
Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998) that 
there is need for more studies on corporate 
taxpayers especially in non-developed 
countries.  
 
3. Proposed Model and Contribution 
 
The current study proposed a model to 
investigate small corporate tax non-
compliance behavior in Nigerian context. The 
model consists of 10 variables in which nine 
influence tax non-compliance behavior. The 
discussion of the variables focused on the 
new variables introduced in this study to 
extend the literature of corporate tax non-
compliance; namely, direct effect of role of 
tax tribunal and the indirect effects of tax 
compliance costs and public governance 
quality. Moreover, the proposed model 
combines deterrence, voluntary and 
institutional factors. Figure 3.1 presents the 
proposed model of this study. The model 
incorporates tax rate, audit penalty and 
complexity as tax structure variables 
(Fischer et al., 1992). While, this study 
considers fairness of the tax system, public 
governance quality and effective role of tax 
tribunal to be factors that can encourage 
voluntary compliance. Finally, bribery, role 
of tax tribunal and tax compliance costs are 
considered as institutional factors in the tax 
system as they become regular part of the 

















Figure 3.1: Proposed model of the current 
study 
 
The relationship between tax structure 
variables and tax non-compliance behavior 
has always been important to tax literature 
and policy. This is proven by the fact that the 
theories and classical models of tax non-
compliance behavior were based on tax 
structure variable. Moreover, the tax 
enforcement mechanisms namely, audit and 
penalty has always been a focus of most tax 
regimes in either developed or developing 
country. Moreover, this study underpinned 
the relationship between tax rate, audit and 


















based on deterrence theory of (Becker, 
1968). According to this theory, a taxpayer is 
considered as rational being who gambles 
between the cost of detection and 
punishment and successful tax evasion (non-
compliance) (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). In 
other words, tax non-compliance is 
determined by the level of detection 
probability and severity of penalty. In the 
theory, tax rate determines the amount of the 
tax payment as well as the amount evaded. 
 
The relationships between all the other 
influencing variables and tax non-compliance 
behavior were supported with social 
exchange theory. Social exchange theory 
proposes that social relationships are 
established based reciprocity and that the 
relationship sustained where both parties get 
more benefits. Starting with the relationship 
between complexity and tax non-compliance 
behavior, simplicity is one of the qualities of a 
good tax system in the canon of taxation. 
Thus, complex tax system creates difficulty to 
the taxpayers in the process of paying their 
taxes. The process of meeting this civic 
responsibility should be made as simple as 
possible. Hence, if the government provided 
policies that make the payment of taxes 
simple, the taxpayers will reciprocate by 
paying their taxes.  Complexity is also 
considered as another important variable 
associated with tax structure (Devos, 2007). 
In the case of bribery, the taxpayers may take 
the advantage of the corrupt tax authority’s 
staff by giving bribery in order to reduce 
their tax liability. For fairness, the small 
corporate taxpayers may perceive that the 
tax system is unfair by allowing them to 
operate under the same laws with large 
companies (e.g. paying tax based on the same 
income tax rate). In return, for the unfair 
treatment, the small companies may engage 
in non-compliance. 
 
3.1 Tax Tribunal and Small Corporate Tax 
Non-compliance Behavior 
 
Tax tribunal is a quasi-judicial court with 
authority to judge tax disputes between the 
tax authority and the taxpayers. Tax 
tribunals are part of the judicial system 
which are responsible for administering 
justice (Ransome, 2008). Tax tribunal is 
expected to be effective in settling tax cases 
and passing fair judgment based on its 
jurisdiction. Hence, the taxpayers will have 
confidence and get encouraging on the 
system and in turn comply with the tax laws. 
On the other hand, fair punishment of the 
guilty through penalties, etc., can send a 
message to other taxpayers to comply. In 
Nigeria, the tax tribunal has been established 
to ensure fairness and transparency of the 
tax system in order to encourage 
compliance. More importantly, the tax 
tribunal is set with the objective of reducing 
the delays (of the regular court system) in 
the litigation of tax disputes and hence 
improve the taxpayers’ confidence in the 
system. Obayemi (2015) emphasized the 
importance of efficient and fair tax tribunal 
to both taxpayers and tax authority as major 
stakeholders in the appeals process in 
Nigeria. 
  
Studies of procedural justice indicated that 
authorities that treat subjects with respect, 
trust, fairness, and justice, will enjoy 
cooperation of the subjects (Murphy & Tyler, 
2008). Thus, the subjects will comply with 
the laws of the authority. Therefore, if the 
role of the judicial system is efficient and fair 
this should help to make all subjects abide by 
the laws and create confidence in all the 
systems of the country. Moreover, empirical 
evidence has shown that there is connection 
between procedural treatment and trusting 
in authority (Murphy, 2004). Thus, this study 
proposes, in the Nigerian context, that the 
role of the tax tribunal have negative 
influence on small corporate tax non-
compliance behavior.  
 
3.2 Tax Compliance Cost as Mediator 
 
Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick (1989) 
defined tax compliance cost as “The costs 
incurred by taxpayers, or third parties such 
as businesses, in meeting the requirements 
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laid down upon them with a given tax 
structure”. Hence, tax compliance costs 
involve the extra costs incurred by the 
taxpayer in the process of complying with the 
tax law. Small corporate taxpayers, in 
Nigeria, operate under the self-assessment 
system. Under this system, taxpayers are 
expected to assess themselves and make the 
tax payment. Hence, the SAS shifts more 
responsibilities to the taxpayer that make it 
necessary for the taxpayer to incur extra 
costs for hiring the services of a tax 
consultant and additional records-keeping. 
Under high detection probability and high 
penalty, the taxpayers may find it necessary 
to incur high tax compliance costs in order to 
file the correct returns to avoid punishment. 
Similarly, when the taxpayers have high 
perception of fairness and the system is 
uncorrupted, they may be willing to incur the 
extra cost to make sure they file the correct 
returns. Conversely, under an unfair and 
corrupt tax system, they may not be willing 
to incur the extra costs to make sure they file 
the correct returns, especially when the audit 
and penalty structures are weak. 
Consequently, tax compliance costs may be 
the fundamental reasons why the taxpayer 
complies or does not comply. 
 
Based on the social exchange theory, when 
the taxpayers perceive the tax system to be 
fair and uncorrupt they may reciprocate by 
complying with the tax laws. However, 
excessive tax compliance cost is the reason 
that discourages voluntary compliance 
(Yesegat, 2009). Although, there is lack of 
empirical attention to the mediating role of 
compliance costs, a number of studies have 
considered its direct effect on compliance 
behavior (Abdul Jabbar, 2009; Das-gupta, 
2002; Nur-tegin, 2008; Sapiei & Kasipillai, 
2010; Slemrod, 2004; Yesegat, 2009). Finally, 
the current study proposes the mediating 
effect of compliance cost between the 
relationships of the determinants of 
corporate tax non-compliance behavior and 
the non-compliance behavior. 
 
3.3 Public Governance Quality as 
Moderator  
 
Besançon (2003) described public 
governance quality as a provision of public 
goods and services with a high order of 
excellence. In many countries, the level of 
compliance with laws may be explained by 
the political conditions as the political 
system determines economic activities 
(Torgler & Schneider, 2007). Hence, Alms et 
al. (2010) argued that when taxpayers 
receive an adequate supply of public goods, 
their willingness to pay tax increases. From 
the theoretical viewpoint, the social 
exchange theory offers the basis for the 
moderating role of public governance quality 
on the relationship between tax non-
compliance and its determinants. As mention 
earlier, the theory proposes that social 
relationships are based on subjective costs 
and benefits associated with the relationship 
(Homans, 1961). Thus, even if the 
relationship between tax non-compliance 
and its determinants is weal, taxpayers’ 
consideration of quality of public goods and 
services may change the relationship to be 
strong. Torgler and Schneider (2007) opined 
that when citizens receive an adequate 
supply of public goods, their willingness to 
contribute to the government also increases. 
 
Empirical evidence have shown that public 
governance quality has influence on tax 
compliance behavior (Alabede, Ariffin, et al., 
2011a; J Alm & Gomez, 2008; James Alm, 
Jackson, & Mckee, 1992; Saidu & Dauda, 
2014; Wallschutzky, 1985). However, 
corporate tax compliance literature showed 
that the relationship between corporate tax 
non-compliance behavior and some of its 
determinants were inconsistent. For 
example, Rice (1992) and Joulfaian (2000) 
reported that tax rate influences corporate 
tax non-compliance behavior; whereas 
Kamdar (1997) found no relationship 
between the two variables. Also, Sapiei and 
Kasipillai (2013) reported Significant 
influence of fairness on tax non-compliance 
whereas Abdul Jabbar (2009) reported the 
opposite. In the same vein, DeBacker, Heim 
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and Tran (2012) found significant effect of 
corruption on non-compliance, but Alon and 
Hageman (2013) reported insignificant 
effect. Hence, inconsistency of findings 
indicates that the relationships are not 
conclusive. Thus, there is need for 
introduction of moderator variable which 
may interact with the direct variables and 
strengthen the relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent 
one.  In line with the submission of Baron 
and Kenny (1986) that a moderating variable 
can be introduced when there is 
inconsistency, the current study proposes 
that efficient provision of public goods and 
services may interact with the independents 





Giving the declining oil prices and production 
challenges that drastically reduced Nigeria 
revenue generation, the country must 
enhance its taxation to ensure stable flow of 
revenue for financing development.  In this 
regard, the current study proposed a 
comprehensive model of small corporate 
taxpayers’ tax non-compliance behavior in 
Nigeria to enhance tax revenue generation 
from this integral part of corporate 
taxpayers. This study reviews previous 
literature and developed its model based on 
deterrence and social exchange theories. This 
study extends the findings of previous 
studies by investigating the direct influence 
of the role of tax tribunal and the moderating 
and mediating effects of public governance 
quality and compliance costs respectively on 
non-compliance behavior of small corporate 
taxpayers in Nigeria. This study is a 
foundation of a main study which would 
continue to collect data and analyze 
accordingly if the model is validated.  This 
study is set with the hope that the findings of 
the final study would help in formulating 
policy to curtailing tax non-compliance and 
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